By Dick Trent, Jr

On July 16, 1998, four days after France defeated Brazil 3-0 at Paris’ Stade de France in the World Cup Final, Project 2010 was submitted to the United States Soccer Federation. Carlos Queiroz had been commissioned by the USSF (under then President Alan Rothenberg) in January of that year to create a thoroughly comprehensive report on the overall state of soccer in the US, which Sunil Gulati (who was Major League Soccer’s Deputy Commissioner at the time, and would go on to be elected USSF President in 2006) later described as "an independent look at the landscape here with a third party point of view." What Queiroz turned in totaled 114 pages, which included the cover featuring the iconic photo of astronaut Alan Shepard standing on the moon next to the US flag, with the FIFA World Cup Trophy in front of his right hand and a soccer ball in front of his left foot, both very poorly superimposed. Above the slightly altered historical image were the words, in all red and in all capitals, "WE CAN FLY". The next page contained the text "Winning the World Cup by 2010: Soccer’s Equivalent to the Apollo XI Moon Landing" (never mind that the cover page photo of Shepard was from Apollo 14). What followed on this page was the famous quote by President John F. Kennedy from 1961 about the US putting a man on the moon before that decade had concluded, and below this, the sentence which truly encapsulates the entire report: "For U.S. Soccer, Project 2010, as stated by U.S. Soccer, has set a goal of playing host to, and to be in a position to win the World Cup in the year 2010."

While not implicitly stating that Project 2010 was meant to be the blueprint which was going to enable the US to win World Cup 2010, as was widely thought to be the case at the time and is still generally misremembered as such, the intent was none the less clear: overhaul soccer from top to bottom and bottom to top in the country so that the US can be a top favorite alongside the sport’s major powers in twelve years time.

When Rothenberg, Gulati, and then USSF Secretary General Hank Steinbrecher hired Carlos Queiroz to create Project 2010, the then 44 year-old had already had a impressive managerial career which had seen him win consecutive FIFA World Youth Championships with Portugal (1989 and 1991), and the Portuguese Cup (Taca de Portugal) with Sporting Lisbon in 1995, as well as leading the senior Portugal side in between. Queiroz was known to the powers-that-be in US Soccer and MLS from his stint as manager of the New York/New Jersey MetroStars in 1996 (as he replaced Eddie Firmani after 8 matches into the inaugural season). From there, Queiroz had accepted a reported $2 million offer to take charge of Japan’s Nagoya Grampus Eight. A split from the J-League club however in November, 1997, made Queiroz immediately available for this massive undertaking.

Queiroz enlisted his close friend Dan Gaspar to be his collaborator and co-author for Project 2010 (Gaspar was noted as "assisting" Queiroz in the report). The Connecticut-born Gaspar had previously been hired by Queiroz as Portugal’s U-16 and U-18 goalkeeper coach, and then served in the same role under Queiroz for his managerial stops at Sporting Lisbon, the Metro Stars, and Nagoya Grampus.

From there, the two men spent the next seven months traveling the country, and occasionally the world, to attend a documented 32 events ranging from the MLS Combine in Ft. Lauderdale, to the Belgium vs US friendly in Brussels, to the United States Youth Soccer Association convention in Dallas. They also interviewed a recorded 54 people: everyone from Tony Meola, Bob Gansler, Tab Ramos, and Bruce Arena, to soccer writer Paul Gardner and ESPN soccer producer Mitch Green.

Despite all of this work, and a reported $50 million eventually spent to fulfill the mission of Project 2010, this report is now largely forgotten. If it is remembered at all, it’s usually to point out the potent mix of arrogance and cluelessness which created a document that had the audacity to purport that the US could be in the ultra-elite group of nations to realistically challenge for the World Cup in a dozen years hence. A few media stories revived the memory of Project 2010 on the eve of World Cup 2010, all of which stated the obvious: that the US was not a favorite, or even remotely close, to claim the championship in South Africa. A second round of Project 2010 remembrance stories were written this past November, as the US was set to play the Carlos Queiroz managed Iran for a potential place in the Round of 16 at World Cup 2022. When asked about Project 2010’s legacy during a press conference in Doha prior to the US vs Iran match, Queiroz stated, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the report which he had co-authored with Dan Gaspar, was able to "help football in the United States to grow up."

As the United States has now completed it’s third World Cup cycle since the lofty goal of being "in a position to win the World Cup in the year 2010" was set to be realized, it’s obviously easy to look back at Project 2010 with derision and mockery. The US is still nowhere close to being France, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, or Spain. They’re not even Croatia or Belgium, nor arguably South Korea or Morocco.

Yet what is indisputable is that Project 2010 laid out a plan to completely overhaul soccer, and indeed soccer culture in the US, from the youth system to the college game, the professional ranks, and ultimately all the way through to the full US squad. Among it’s legacies are the creation of IMG Academy in Bradenton, Florida, which served as the home of US U-16 and U-17 men’s sides from 1999 through 2017; the push to have the top teenage players in the country sign pro contracts rather than college letters of intent; and the considerable shortening of the MLS off-season.

It’s indisputable as well that soccer has gained a relevancy, popularity, and indeed awareness in this country at levels never before seen--exponentially higher than when the US hosted World Cup 1994, when MLS was launched in 1996, when a quarterfinal place was secured at World Cup 2002, and even when a draw was recorded vs England at World Cup 2010. Soccer, and how it’s perceived in the United States, has changed so dramatically since the late 1980’s, that it was as surprising, indeed shocking, to most general sports fans in this country when the US failed to qualify for Russia 2018, as it was when they gained entry into Italia 1990.

The US is no longer a joke nation when it comes to soccer, no longer a novelty, no longer an outlier. Chief among a multitude of factors for this is appearances for the US in 8 of the past 9 World Cups. As Carlos Queiroz himself said at that Doha World Cup presser this past November, the US is "a different team from the United States that I saw and met at the beginning (mid and late 1990’s)…they’ve jumped from soccer to football…modern football." This view is now shared by the vast majority of the sport, as well as sports fans--in this country and internationally.

But does this hard-earned respect and validation translate to glory when the matches really matter? Or does it simply mean that the US has emerged over the last generation and a half as a squad that is expected to be at every World Cup, but never expected to actually trouble any of the major footballing nations, especially once group play has concluded?

Increased expectations are of course far different than improved results. Now 25 years on from the submission of Project 2010, and 13 years on from it’s targeted deadline, the question to truly be asked is if the US is actually any closer to realistically challenging for a World Cup that it was when Paul Caligiuri’s November, 1989, "Shot Heard ‘Round the World" in Port of Spain propelled the US past Trinidad and Tobago 1-0, and into the following year’s World Cup--the first appearance on the sport’s biggest stage for the US since 1950.

From 1988 through 2022, the United States played 607 total matches; beginning this 34 year span with a 1-0 loss in a friendly away to Guatemala in Guatemala City on January 10, 1988, and concluding with a 3-1 loss vs the Netherlands in the World Cup Round of 16 on December 3, 2022, in Al Rayyan. For this article, I analyzed all 607 of these US matches, dividing them into three specific time periods with Project 2010 and World Cup cycles both firmly in mind.

The first time period is 1988 through 1998, which covers the opening of World Cup 1990 Qualification, the disastrous US World Cup performance in France (losses in all 3 matches and a -4 goal differential), and the year in which Queiroz and Gaspar turned in their report. The second time period is 1999 through 2010, which covers the target years for Project 2010 enactments and reforms, and the US’ run to the Quarter Finals at the Japan/South Korea World Cup. The third is 2011 through 2022, which covers the post-Project 2010 world, concluding with the US’ advancement beyond Group Play in Qatar.

Before the numbers, a few notes. Only matches recognized as official by the US Soccer Federation are counted. Thus, matches that were designated as scrimmages, closed door, or with the "B" team, are not included. Friendlies are considered every match not part of an official FIFA or Confederation competition. So this includes matches featuring national sides from tournaments which lack this designation, such as the now defunct US Cup (not to be confused of course with the US Open Cup). Competitive matches are those from an official FIFA and Confederation competition, such as the World Cup, World Cup Qualification, the Copa America, and the CONCACAF Gold Cup. And while FIFA of course records a match which reaches penalty kicks as a "draw", for the purposes here, the result is listed as a win or loss based on the outcome of penalties.

In regards to friendlies, a quality result can of course boost morale and confidence for the players and coaches; excite and rally the fans and media; and even serve as a sense of national pride. But of course these matches are essentially meaningless in the grand scheme of things. Thus, the primary focus here will be on the matches that actually matter (although there is a detailed accounting of friendlies in the tables below). After all, nowhere in Project 2010’s 114 pages were achieving better results in friendlies mentioned; nor should this have been.

With all of this in mind, on then to the numbers.

From 1988-1998, the US recorded 76 wins, 53 draws, and 82 losses in all matches, for a winning percentage of .486%. In competitive matches, they were 34 wins, 13 draws, and 20 losses, for a winning percentage of .605%.

From 1999-2010, the US recorded 112 wins, 35 draws, and 51 losses in all matches, for a winning percentage of .654%. In competitive matches, they were 67 wins, 17 draws, and 27 losses, for a winning percentage of .680%.

From 2011-2022, the US recorded 109 wins, 39 draws, and 50 losses in all matches, for a winning percentage of .649%. In competitive matches, they were 65 wins, 16 draws, and 24 losses, for a winning percentage of .695%.

As listed above, the US’ winning percentage in all matches increased from .486% (1989-1998) to .649% (2011-2022); obviously impressive. In competitive matches, the jump was less dramatic, from .605% (1989-1998) to .695% (2011-2022). And as seen above, the winning percentage increase from 1999-2010 to 2011-2022 (.680% to .695%) is almost insignificant--change two losses to one win and one draw over those 111 competitive matches during 1999-2010, and that time periods’ winning percentage moves to an identical .695%.

The next area to focus on is matches in which the US achieved at least 1 point in competitive matches--thus a win or draw. For the purposes here, this will be referred to as win/draw percentage.

From 1988-1998, the US won or drew .702% of their competitive matches. This figure was .757% for 1999-2010, and .771% for 2011-2022. As listed above with winning percentage in competitive matches, the percentages here grew through all three time periods. And as listed above, the growth from 1999-2010 to 2011-2022 was negligible--change two losses to two draws over those 111 competitive matches in 1999-2010, and this time periods’ win/draw percentage moves to a superior .775%.

Next up is the US’ performance in competitive matches based on location. Rather than break this down to home, away, and neutral site, the following numbers reflect if the match was played on US soil or not. Thus all 118 competitive match played by the US over the past 34 years which took place outside of the country, are for the purposes here, considered away matches. And one additional note: even if the US was the designated "away" side for a competitive match which took place in the country, it is still considered a "home" match for the numbers below.

From 1988-1998 in competitive home matches, the US had a record of 26 wins, 6 draws, and 5 losses for a winning percentage of .784% and a win/draw percentage of .865%. In competitive away matches over this time period, the US recorded 8 wins, 7 draws, and 15 losses for a .383% winning percentage and a .500% win/draw percentage.

From 1999-2010 in competitive home matches, the US had a home record of 48 wins, 5 draws, and 4 losses for a winning percentage of .886% and a win/draw percentage of .930%. In competitive away matches over this time period, the US recorded 19 wins, 12 draws, and 23 losses for a .463% winning percentage and a .574% win/draw percentage.

From 2011-2022 in competitive matches, the US had a home record of 57 wins, 3 draws, and 11 losses for a winning percentage of .824% and a win/draw percentage of .845%. In away matches over this time period, the US recorded 8 wins, 13 draws, and 13 losses for a .427% winning percentage and a .618% win/draw percentage.

As listed above, the US has actually gone backwards in winning percentage for competitive matches at home--dropping from the 1999-2010 mark of .886% to .824% for 2011-2022. Matches in which the US achieved at least 1 point at home (win or draw) dropped as well, and significantly: from .930% for 1999-2010 to .845% for 2011-2022.

As listed below, the US scored an average of 1.68 goals per competitive home match from 1988-1998, 2.33 goals per home competitive match from 1999-2010, and 2.35 goals per home competitive match from 2011-2022. There is definitely a sizeable and impressive increase from the 1988-1998 time period to the 1999-2010 time period, but then no significant progress for the following time period of 2011-2022.

The data for the US’ competitive away matches winning percentage shows that the US took a big step forward from the 1988-1998 time period (.383%) to the 1999-2010 time period (.463%), and the took took a small step backwards for the 2011-2022 time period (.427% ).

In terms of goal scoring in competitive away matches, the US was at 0.93 goals per match for the 1988-1998 time period, 1.19 goals per match for 1999-2010, and 1.15 goals per match for the 2011-2022. As with goals scored in competitive home matches over the last 34 years, US away goals when the matches mattered saw a marked improvement from the first time period to the second, and then were essentially statistically flat from the second to the third.

The final data to be analyzed here is how the US has fared against non-CONCACAF opposition in competitive matches over the past 34 years. Of course during this span, it is indisputable that the US has fully achieved status as one of the dominant nations (and arguably the most dominant nation) in CONCACAF, which certainly wasn’t the case, or even close, prior to the 1990 World Cup cycle. Success in 7 out of their last 8 World Cup Qualification campaigns (1994 was of course automatic entry as host nation), championships in 6 of the past 11 CONCACAF Gold Cups, and a title in the first ever CONCACAF Nations League in 2020, provide resounding proof. But outside of CONCACAF, the numbers provide a very different narrative.

From 1988 to 1998, the US had a record of 5 wins, 2 draws, and 12 losses against non-CONCACAF opponents in competitive matches. That’s a .316% winning percentage, a .368 % win/draw percentage, with a goal differential of -14.

From 1999 to 2010, the US had a record of 8 wins, 5 draws, and 15 losses against non-CONCACAF opponents in competitive matches. That’s a .375% winning percentage, a .464% win/draw percentage, with a goal differential of -11.

From 2011 to 2022, the US had a record of 6 wins, 3 draws, and 6 losses against non-CONCACAF opponents in competitive matches. That’s a .500% winning percentage, a .600% win/draw percentage, with a goal differential of 0.

Of all of the metrics listed above in which substantial progress can be seen across the three analyzed time periods for the US, this is clearly the one. But a .500% winning percentage outside of your confederation doesn’t bring home the World Cup--or even close. For comparison, Argentina complied a record of 19 wins, 1 draw, and 4 losses with a goal differential of +31 against non-CONMEBOL opponents in competitive matches, over this 2011-2022 time period.

So, where do all of these metrics, all of these stats, all of these results over the past 34 years leave us? What story do they actually tell? Well, opinion, conjecture, and optimism are certainly not numbers and cold-hard facts.

And the cold-hard facts gleaned from this data compiled from 607 matches spanning 1988 through 2022 show that the United States is not really any closer to winning the World Cup in 2024 than they were to winning the World Cup in 1990. The brutal truth is clear: Project 2010 did many things to greatly improve the soccer landscape in this country, but it has done absolutely nothing to put the US "in a position to win the World Cup in the year 2010", or anytime in the foreseeable future.

1988-1998

US in all matches:

76 wins, 53 draws, 82 losses, 251 GF, 239 GA, +12 GD, 1.19 GFPM, 1.13 GAPM

.486% win percentage, .611% win/draw percentage

US in friendly matches:

42 wins, 40 draws, 62 losses, 161 GF, 171 GA, -10 GD, 1.12 GFPM, 1.19 GAPM

.431% win percentage, .569% win/draw percentage

US in competitive matches:

All- 34 wins, 13 draws, 20 losses, 90 GF, 68 GA, +22 GD, 1.34 GFPM, 1.01 GAPM

.605% win percentage, .702% win/draw percentage

Home- 26 wins, 6 draws, 5 losses, 62 GF, 28 GA, +34 GD, 1.68 GFPM, 0.76 GAPM

.784% win percentage, .865% win/draw percentage

Away-8 wins, 7 draws, 15 losses, 28 GF, 40 GA, -12 GD, 0.93 GFPM, 1.33 GAPM

.383% win percentage, .500 win/draw percentage

Vs. Non-CONCACAF Opponents- 5wins, 2 draws, 12 losses, 21 GF, 35 GA, -14 GD

1.10 GFPM, 1.84 GAPM, .316% win percentage, .368% win/draw percentage

1999-2010

US in all matches:

112 wins, 35 draws, 51 losses, 333 GF, 182 GA, +151 GD, 1.68 GFPM, 0.92 GAPM

.654% win percentage, .742% win/draw percentage

US in friendly matches:

45 wins, 18 draws, 24 losses, 136 GF, 82 GA, +54 GD, 1.56 GFPM, 0.94 GAPM

.621% win percentage, .724% win/draw percentage

US in competitive matches:

All- 67 wins, 17 draws, 27 losses, 197 GF, 100 GA, +97 GD, 1.77 GFPM,

0.90 GAPM, .680% win percentage, .757% win/draw percentage

Home- 48 wins, 5 draws, 4 losses, 133 GF, 31 GA, +102 GD, 2.33 GFPM,

0.54 GAPM, .886% win percentage, .930% win/draw percentage

Away- 19 wins, 12 draws, 23 losses, 64 GF, 69 GA, -5 GD, 1.19 GFPM, 1.28 GAPM

.463% win percentage, .574% win/draw percentage

Vs. Non-CONCACAF Opponents- 8 wins, 5 draws, 15 losses, 33 GF, 44 GA, -11 GD

1.18 GFPM, 1.57 GAPM, .375% win percentage, .464% win/draw percentage

2011-2022

US in all matches:

109 wins, 39 draws, 50 losses, 351 GF, 190 GA, +161 GD, 1.77 GFPM, 0.96 GAPM

.649% win percentage, .748% win/draw percentage

US in friendly matches:

44 wins, 23 draws, 26 losses, 145 GF, 101 GA, +44 GD, 1.56 GFPM, 1.09 GAPM

.599% win percentage, .720% win/draw percentage

US in competitive matches:

All- 65 wins, 16 draws, 24 losses, 206 GF, 89 GA, +117 GD, 1.96 GFPM,

0.85 GAPM, .695% win percentage, .771% win/draw percentage

Home- 57 wins, 3 draws, 11 losses, 167 GF, 46 GA, +121 GD, 2.35 GFPM,

0.65 GAPM, .824% win percentage, .845% win/draw percentage

Away- 8 wins, 13 draws, 13 losses, 39 GF, 43 GA, -4 GD, 1.15 GFPM, 1.26 GAPM

.427% win percentage, .618% win/draw percentage

Vs. Non-CONCACAF Opponents- 6 wins, 3 draws, 6 losses, 16 GF, 16 GA, 0 GD

1.07 GFPM, 1.07 GAPM, .500% win percentage, .600% win/draw percentage

Key:

GF--Goals For

GA--Goals Against

GD--Goal Differential

GFPM--Goals For Per Match

GAPM--Goals Against Per Match